As Joseph Schacht argued in the 1950s, the office of qāḋī began in the Umayyad period as that of a "legal secretary" to provincial governors. Documentary evidence from Egypt confirms that governors were indeed regarded as the highest judicial authority in early Islam, and that their legal powers far surpassed that of any other judge. In large cities, governors appointed and dismissed qāḋīs at will; decisions taken by qāḋīs could be swiftly overruled by political authorities.
Introduction
The history of qāḋ īs is mainly known through biographical dictionaries, written after the 240s/850s, that attempt to reconstruct the lives of judges from the first/ninth century. Modern historians usually assume that individuals already held judicial responsibilities within the societies that developed following the first Islamic conquests, from the mid-10s/630s onwards. 1 The status of early qāḋ īs remains obscure, however, and it is doubtful whether we shall ever find enough evidence to obtain a clear picture of their actual position and responsibilities. Principal biographers of qāḋ īs -Wakīʿ (d. 306/918) for Arabia and Iraq, and al-Kindī (d. 350/961) for Egyptwrote in the late third/ninth or in the fourth/ tenth century, drawing from dry and scattered traditions. Such accounts were very similar in nature to ancient, non-prophetic Ḣ adīth as recorded in early muṡ annafs of ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṡ anʿānī (d. 211/827) or Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849). These traditions were not designed to describe early judges' lives or practices, but rather to record exempla within a broader context of the early formation of Islamic law. Systematic reconstruction of qāḋ īs' biographies only began in the second ʿAbbāsid period in the second half of the third/ninth century after a new political and religious order was reached following the end of the miḣ na. Relationships between scholars and rulers had been subjected to tremendous ordeals, in which qāḋ īs had played a major part. Following the caliph's instruction, they had been the main instruments in the imposition of the doctrine of the created Qurʾān. The cessation of the miḣ na under Caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 232-247/847-861) marked the victory of traditionalist scholars, who imposed themselves, at the expense of the caliph, as the only true religious authorities. The process leading to this new order had to be explained, understood and justified. While scholars such as al-Ṫ abarī (d. 310/923) reformulated the whole of Islamic political history, others concentrated on key institutions like the judiciary, which stood at a junction between the political and legal domains. These historians did not look at the past in a neutral way. Although they did not hesitate to confront and report various versions of the same event, their whole enterprise was oriented toward a justification of the present. Notwithstanding the inherently subjective nature of these accounts, which conveniently selected one fact over another, they still provide a coherent image that reveals actual historical tendencies. One of the main themes in historiographical literature dedicated to qāḋ īs is their relationships with rulers. As is typical in Islamic historiography, sources describe all relationships in terms of personal connections; in reality, such relations reveal deeper, structural patterns of interactions between institutions.
One prominent underlying question concerning Islamic sources from the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries is that of judicial authority. Who holds this authority? Is it the caliph? Is it one of his direct representatives? Is it the judge? From the early Umayyads onwardor from even earlier periods justice was dispensed by delegation: qāḋ īs were appointed by political or military rulers. What did such delegation mean? To what extent did rulers reserve their right to monitor the judicial practice of their appointees? While Islam first developed as a military movement in which authority was vested in military rulers, the first three centuries of Islam witnessed a progressive affirmation of scholarly authority that challenged this initial order. How did the qāḋ īs, who increasingly belonged to the class of such scholars, react to these changes? To what extent did they exercise sufficient authority to shape society as they envisaged it?
In what follows, I shall try to highlight the main evolution of the relationship between qāḋ īs and political rulers from the late Umayyad period until the fourth/ tenth century. I shall draw on both narrative and legal sources in order to show how a new notion of political and legal order was progressively promoted by Muslim scholars.
1. The limited authority of qāḋ īs under the Umayyads and early ʿAbbā sids
Qāḋ īs and governors
According to sources, during the Umayyad period a large majority of qāḋ īs was appointed by provincial or city governors. There are some exceptions, of course. Between 99/717 and 114/733, three Umayyad caliphs are reported to have directly appointed qāḋ īs. 2 Yet these exceptions are rare and such instances have only been reported in Egypt. Judges in Baṡra, Kū fa and Madīna were still duly appointed by local governors. 3 The governors' role in appointing qāḋ īs led Joseph Schacht to present them as being "legal secretaries" of governors. 4 The latter "retained [ … ] the power of reserving for his own decision any lawsuit he wished". 5 Papyrological evidence suggests that the Egyptian governor was considered as the highest judicial authority in his province, and that some litigants filed their complaints with him directly. 6 What would happen, then, when litigants referred their cases to a qāḋ ī? To what extent could the qāḋ ī deliver and implement decisions free from the influence of the governor? Steven Judd has recently argued that "[t]he general image of the Umayyad judicial system presented in the sources is one of judicial autonomy and independence". 7 His conclusions rely on narratives depicting a qāḋ ī defying a governor, or a governor obeying a qāḋ ī's decision. 8 These narratives, however, are only an image of the past, reshaped by their authors' or compilers' interpretations. The story of Shurayḣ refusing to release a prisoner at the governor's request, cited by Judd, 9 is actually more than equivocal, as we have shown elsewhere. Other reports suggest that the same qāḋ ī, confronted by identical situations, could not seriously oppose the political authority. 10 It is necessary to remember that the image of judicial independence that occasionally appears in sources about the Umayyad period was shaped during the ʿAbbāsid period, by authors whose agenda, as we shall see later, was to offer models of ideal relationships between the government and the judiciary.
Judd's conclusions about qāḋ īs' independence contradict his own vision of a judiciary used as a political and theological tool in the hands of the Umayyads. 11 Furthermore, a qāḋ ī's liberty was intrinsically limited by his hierarchical connection to the governor. His justice was that of a delegate, and he only held his position on a temporary basis. The governor could revoke his appointment at any time. The office of qāḋ ī was therefore characterised by its structural instability. Should a qāḋ ī's judgement or attitude displease the delegating authority, he could be immediately dismissed, without need for any justification. Moreover, qāḋ īs received a salary, which eventually grew to become quite a comfortable sum under the last Umayyad caliphs, and even more so under the early ʿAbbāsids. They enjoyed a standard of living comparable to that of other high-ranking civil servants. The assumption, therefore, is that those judges who did not have other sources of high income would be tempted to preserve their position at all costs. Scholars who reflected on the judiciary were well aware of this tendency and suggested that no qāḋ ī should be paid for a task that should be regarded first and foremost as a religious duty. 12 Narratives depicting qāḋ īs' resistance to governors mainly illustrate the fact that political authorities did not recognise the independence of the judiciary. More generally, literary sources report numerous cases of governors' interventions in qāḋ īs' judicial activities. The historical significance of such reports has been challenged by Wael Hallaq, who regards encroachments on the judiciary as exceptional cases that were "statistically out of proportion" to the norm. 13 This statement somehow misses the value of narrative sources. Arab Muslim authors did not intend to focus on exceptional events or to provide an exhaustive tool for use by modern historians to perform statistical analysis; their intention was rather to exemplify certain relevant and significant situations. Authors like Wakīʿ and al-Kindī wrote at a time when relationships between rulers and the judiciary were reaching a new equilibrium that benefited the scholars, 14 and they therefore had good reasons to highlight (or even re-elaborate) ancient examples of "orthodox" relationships between judges and rulers. Nevertheless, their writings reveal tensions that would not have been recorded but for their historical relevance. Governors intervened in the judicial process and could undermine the qāḋ īs' decisions. One of the best documented instances of such interference is the release of prisoners by governors whose detention had been ordered by qāḋ īs.
During the late Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid period, qāḋ īs did not have a dedicated prison for "their" prisonerssuch prisoners being litigants they had placed in preventive or administrative detention or incarcerated as discretionary punishment (taʿzīr). 15 Qāḋ īs were obliged to turn to governors who allowed them use of their prison and their jailers. This put the qāḋ īin the awkward position of having his prisoners detained in a structure that was under the governor's authority. 16 Theoretically, an 11 Judd, Religious Scholars, 98-9. Judd also admits that in some cities (especially Baṡra, but also Madīna), governors were more likely to interfere with judicial practice, and that qāḋ īs had to seek the support of the caliph against recalcitrant governors (ibid., pp. 112-13, 124). 12 institution with the power to imprison someone should also have sole responsibility for his release. In practice, however, as prisons were controlled by governors, they could free prisoners whenever they wished. Wakīʿ relates an incident that probably occurred in 126/744, in the reign of caliph Yazīd b. al-Walīd (r. 126/744). ʿĀ mir b. ʿUbayda al-Bāhilī, the qāḋ ī of Baṡra for the governor ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī ʿUthmān, 17 imprisoned a litigant at the request of his adversary, presumably for a debt he could not or would not repay. However, as the governor had personal ties to the prisoner, he released him almost immediately. Imprisonment being the principal means of compelling a debtor to repay his creditor, the adversary notified the qāḋ ī of the prisoner's release. The qāḋ īregarded this release as an unjust infringement upon his judicial practice and quit his court and, as a means of exerting pressure on the governor, he remained at home for several days. The governor, not appreciating such an example of pre-modern industrial action, ordered the qāḋ ī to resume his judicial duties, but the qāḋ ī persisted in his refusal. The governor still did not allow the prisoner to be incarcerated once again, eventually dismissing ʿĀ mir b. ʿUbayda and appointing another qāḋ ī in his place. 18 Similar situations are reported from the early ʿAbbāsid period, at a time when governors still appointed their qāḋ īs, in places such as Fusṫāṫ, 19 Baṡra 20 and Kū fa. 21 In early ʿAbbāsid cases, a new pattern emerges whereby governors commonly yield to the qāḋ īs' pressure and send their prisoners back to jail. It is likely, however, that the Umayyad qāḋ īs lacked effective means to impose their own independent judicial authority. They had either to comply with the governors' will or relinquish their positions. 22 Thus the judicial system rested upon a fundamental ambiguity. On the one hand, governors regarded themselves as sole proprietors of judicial authority. Qāḋ īs were their subordinates and they could therefore intervene in their lawsuits and decisions as they saw fit. On the other, governors accepted to delegate their authority and asked judges to act in their place. As soon as qāḋ īs claimed an authority of their own, arising from their religious knowledge, this ambiguity gave rise to competition. If narratives reflect actual historical reality, qāḋ īs regarded their decisions as binding to the extent that governors had to respect them despite being their direct superiors. These two visions of judicial authority could not be reconciled.
Qāḋ īs and caliphs
The judiciary was not immediately affected by the ʿAbbāsid revolution. For (r. 136-158/754-775), provincial and city governors kept their judicial prerogatives by continuing to appoint qāḋ īs. During the second part of his reign, however, al-Manṡū r began a major administrative reform of the judiciary. Around the time he founded Madīnat al-Salām and transferred the ʿAbbāsid capital to Baghdad, al-Manṡū r undertook an unprecedented centralisation of the judiciarywhich would only be completed under his successors. Henceforth, caliphs would directly appoint qāḋ īs of the empire. By taking away the power of appointment of qāḋ īs from governors, al-Manṡū r may have intentionally weakened the latter's authority (governors who were too strong would become potential rebels) in order to increase the caliph's grip on the state. Moreover, in appointing qāḋ īs within the empire he probably wanted the new dynasty to appear as guarantor of justice and equity throughout the provinces, thereby enhancing its legitimacy. As a consequence of this reform, allusions to rivalry between qāḋ īs and governors almost disappear from sources dealing with later periods.
This shift in the power of appointment from the governor to the caliph, however, still failed to resolve lingering questions over judicial authority. The caliph in fact now considered himself to be the actual holder of judicial authority he had delegated to the qāḋ īs. In certain circumstances, caliphs behaved like the governors of the previous period, and tried to impose their judicial authority against the will of their qāḋ īs. Among diverse examples reported by narrative literature, that of ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḣ asan al-ʿAnbarī (qāḋ ī from 156/773 to 166/782-3) 23 is probably the most significant.
ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḣ asan al-ʿAnbarī was a qāḋ ī of Baṡra at a time when major issues were raised about the status of fertile lands in southern Iraq (the sawād). Caliph al-Mahdī (r. 158-169/775-785) tried to use ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḣ asan to implement a reform of the fiscal status of lands surrounding Baṡra by extending the area subjected to kharāj. However, ʿUbayd Allāh defended the interests of the local people and actively resisted the caliph's orders. 24 On a judicial level, changes of properties in the aftermath of the ʿAbbāsid revolution caused major conflicts in Baṡra. The Caliph Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Saffāḣ had, for instance, offered land to a man called Sulaymān b. ʿUbayd Allāh. Members of another local family, the Banū ʿAbd al-Malik, claimed ownership of that land. They asserted that it had belonged to their ancestor after the conquest of Iraq, and that it had been unjustly confiscated by the Caliph Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 96-99/715-717). The conflict led to a lawsuit before ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḣ asan resulting in a major stand-off between the qāḋ ī and the caliph.
The Caliph al-Mahdī intervened twice in the lawsuit, in two different ways. He was first solicited by the claimants, the Banū ʿAbd al-Malik, whose claim the qāḋ ī was reported to favour. The qāḋ ī had suggested that the claimants should file a complaint directly to the caliph in Baghdad, and one can assume that the suggestion was made with the intention of lending more weight to his decision. The claimants did so by presenting the caliph or his administration with a petition (or so we think), including the identity of their adversary and an outline of the issue being litigated. In return, the caliph wrote a letter to the qāḋ ī, in which he ordered him to hear the case and to render a judgment according to evidence provided by the litigants. 25 This procedure "by rescript" was a legacy from the Umayyad period, during which litigants would commonly present a complaint before a ruler (the caliph or, more often, a governor), who would then issue instructions to the judge. 26 In this instance, the intervention of the caliph in judicial proceedings was encouraged by the qāḋ ī and could not therefore be regarded as an infringement of the judge's prerogatives. It was simply part of accepted procedureeven though evidence of this type of procedure eventually disappeared from subsequent sources.
The caliph's second intervention, however, was of a different nature. According to Wakīʿ, the qāḋ ī ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḣ asan ignored the caliph's order to listen to evidence presented by the defendant (Muḣ ammad b. Sulaymān b. ʿUbayd Allāh) and instead condemned him. In doing so, the qāḋ ī may have been respecting the law of evidence widely acknowledged by scholars of his day, which states that "the burden of the proof lies upon the claimant". According to this rule, a judge had to decide in favour of a claimant if he succeeded in producing reliable testimonial evidence, and should not take the defendant's evidence into consideration. 27 The caliph, however, would not accept the qāḋ ī's disobedience, especially since the defendant had received the disputed land from the first ʿAbbāsid caliph. The qāḋ ī's decision was therefore perceived to challenge both the honour and judicial authority of the ʿAbbāsid caliphs. Al-Mahdī wrote a new letter to the qāḋ ī ordering him to make a public confession of the injustice of his judgment and to issue a fresh decision in favour of the defendant. If the qāḋ ī refused to comply, the caliph would order him to be decapitated. The qāḋ ī had no choice but to revise his judgement. 28 Here, the caliph did not act as an appeal institution . He did not revise the judgement or issue a new verdict, but rather forced the qāḋ ī to do so. He interfered with ʿUbayd Allāh's practice and his threatening order meant he considered the judge to be a subordinate who had to comply with his superior's will. 31 After the miḣ na, interventions in judicial practice by caliphs seem to disappear, and tensions between rulers and qāḋ īs tend henceforward to focus on the judiciary's administrative tasksespecially the pious foundations (waqfs) whose revenues were prone to appropriation by many rulers. 32 It took some time before jurists could impose the idea that qāḋ īs should dispense justice without any interference from rulers. The first jurist who began to theorise about it was ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḣ asan al-ʿAnbarī himself. It is no coincidence that literary sources remembered this qāḋ ī as actively disobeying caliphal instructions. He is indeed the author of an important epistle to the Caliph al-Mahdī, in which he addressed four domains of state administration: management of frontiers, administration of justice, and two different kinds of tax revenues ( fayʾ and ṡ adaqa). 33 Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds were the first to highlight the provocative nature of this epistle, in which al-aʾimma al-fuqahāʾ (the imams-jurists) are the scholars, not the caliph. 34 As Muhammad Qasim Zaman has noticed, ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḣ asan does not deny the legal role of the caliph in certain issues where other sources of law are silent. 35 However, the role of the caliph is much more limited in the four domains that ʿUbayd Allāh addresses in detail. In ʿUbayd Allāh's epistle, there is no mention of caliphs' instructions as being the source of judges' decisions, and it is clear that he does not expect justice to be an area where caliphal instructions should be expected. 36 ʿUbayd Allāh is one of the earliest authors whose positive definition of sources of law has been preserved. In the part of his epistle dedicated to judgeship, he states that every judge should rely on the Qurʾān, the sunna of the Prophet (without any positive definition of the term sunna), 37 fuqahāʾ) and finally his own individual reasoning (ijtihād al-ḣ ākim) in consultation with other knowledgeable scholars. 38 The right to rely on ijtihād belongs first and foremost to the caliph. However, ʿUbayd Allāh considers that the delegation of judicial authority by the caliph to the judge usually indicates the delegation of the right to rely on ijtihād. 39 Results of the judge's own reflexions are therefore fully legitimate, not to be overruled by the caliph's own conclusions. By defending the idea that "any mujtahid is right" (kull mujtahid muṡ īb) and applying it to the qāḋ ī, 40 ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḣ asan planted the seeds of an explicit theory on judicial independence.
Legal developments of qāḋ īs' autonomy
ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḣ asan al-ʿAnbarī wrote his epistle at a time when Islamic law was entering its "literary" stage. It is not until the end of the second/eighth century that we see the development of a more "fixed" body of legal writings, with the diffusion of authored epistles and handbooks. 41 The support enjoyed by Abū Ḣ anīfa's followers from the reign of al-Mahdī onwards eventually led to the formation of a large Ḣ anafī school which absorbed other Iraqi legal trends (Ibn Abī Laylā's, a part of Baṡra's trend, among others). 42 Ḣ anafī jurists were authors of books that soon became, according to al-Jāḣ iż (d. 255/868), standard literature in training to become a judge. 43 The most famous works among this literature were Ḣ anafī treatises on legal formulas (shurūṫ). 44 The formation of other legal madhhabs and the constitution of a wider, fixed corpus of Islamic jurisprudence, conceived at the very latest by the early third/ninth century, transformed the relationship between Muslims and law. 45 Previous legal literature was "organic" in nature in that it was redacted by successive scholars from their master's teaching. Such literature was prone to amendments and modifications over time. Unlike organic literature, fixed texts and legal handbooks constituted a framework of reference that could not easily be manipulated or altered.
It is likely that these changes had important consequences for the judiciary. From the third/ninth century onwards, qāḋ īs could justify their decisions on grounds of a widely accepted body of rules and norms. Fiqh elaborated by private jurists did not only theorise on what was lawful and unlawful, or what penalty should be applied, but also fixed judicial procedures. 46 It therefore became increasingly difficult for political rulers to justify their encroachments upon the judiciary. If we consider how caliphal infringements upon the judiciary were described in literary sources, we can see significant changes taking place between the late second/eighth and the late third/ninth centuries. Whereas qāḋ īs who resisted caliphal instructions in the second/ eighth century were typically sanctioned, a new pattern emerged during the third/ ninth century, when qāḋ īs could impose their views upon rulers. In fact, the status of qāḋ īs improved to such an extent that they were recognised as authentic defenders of the legal order. The legitimacy conferred upon their decisions as a result of their enhanced legal standing allowed qāḋ īs to reject approaches by caliphs or viziers who intervened to protect their preferred litigants or tried to appropriate waqfs or orphans' properties. 47 Literary sources reflect a new pattern in which qāḋ īs had more room to manoeuvre and impose their voices.
On a theoretical level, during the third/ninth century, Ḣ anafī jurists began to question the link between the caliph and his qāḋ īs. 48 According to the jurist al-Khaṡṡāf (d. 261/874), the qāḋ ī could issue a judgement against the caliph, despite the former being a deputy of the latter. 49 There was, however, a paradox in this statement: if judicial authority derived from the appointment of a judge by the caliph, why would the latter have to submit to the judgement of his own delegate? How could the caliph be at the same time the ultimate source of judicial power and yet be a simple litigant?
Later jurists and scholars tried their best to solve this paradox by minimising the caliph's role in judicial organisation. Although the caliph formally appointed qāḋ īs, he was not the ultimate source of judicial authority. In his introduction to Akhbār alquḋ āt, Wakīʿ alluded to the fact that all judicial authority came from God and that caliphs were forced to submit to judicial control as they would submit to God. 50 According to literary sources, several qāḋ īs used the same argument to reject caliphal instructions. 51 However, placing the caliph as an intermediary between God and the Muslims was a dangerous idea. It could pave the way for a claim that the caliph was God's deputy on earth, inviting even more trouble for qāḋ īs trying to impose their legal decisions. Another solution was to place the qāḋ ī under the authority of another entity. A century after al-Khaṡṡāf, al-Jaṡṡāṡ (d. 370/980) eventually found a solution. Using a newly developed concept, that of farḋ kifāya, 52 this Ḣ anafī jurist stated that the qāḋ ī did not dispense justice on behalf of the caliph, but rather on behalf of the Muslim community. How then, could he explain the fact that the qāḋ ī was still appointed by the caliph? Al-Jaṡṡāṡ replied that the qāḋ ī was indeed a representative (wakīl) of the caliph, but that the latter was himself a representative (wakīl) of the community. 53 According to Ḣ anafī law, the wakīl of another wakīl did not act on behalf of the person who appointed him, but rather on behalf of the individual who stood at the top of the pyramid of delegation. 54 Although he was appointed by the caliph, the qāḋ ī was therefore actually a representative of the Muslims. The qāḋ ī served the Muslim community, not the caliph, on the basis of laws formulated by the legal scholars ( fuqahāʾ). According to this theory, a qāḋ ī could be appointed by rebels (Khārijites), and even by the community itself in the absence of a ruler. 55 In theory at least, any relationship of authority that had previously existed between the caliph and the qāḋ ī was now dissolved and the caliph could no longer justify his interventions in the daily practice of his judges.
A new model of judicial autonomy: the example of adab literature
Al-Jaṡṡāṡ developed his theory in the context of a weakened ʿAbbāsid caliphate. From 334/945 onwards, the Bū yids became the actual rulers and most of the caliph's state prerogatives were transferred to the amīr al-umarāʾ, at times even including the appointment of qāḋ īs. 56 Because of their political position, caliphs could no longer claim any actual control over daily administration of the judiciary. In this context, proclaiming theoretical independence of qāḋ īs vis-à-vis the caliphate was an easier task for the jurists than it had been in the late second/eighth century.
This theory paved the way for the development of a political model that was soon embraced by adab literature. Narratives about qāḋ īs who disobeyed the caliph's orders, or of rulers who eventually admitted the rightfulness of their judge, were already part of the biographical works of the early fourth/tenth century. It is only in the late fourth/tenth century, however, that books exclusively dedicated to the relationships between the judiciary and the state began to appear. In what follows, I shall draw on a short adab book by the famous author Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (d. c. 400/1010), entitled Kitāb mā iḣ takama bi-hi al-khulafāʾ ilā l-quḋ āt (The Book of Cases Submitted by Caliphs to Judges). 57 Abū Hilāl lived in Khū zistān under the Bū yid dynasty only two or three decades after al-Jaṡṡāṡ, and belongs to the generation of scholars who took advantage of the new political situation to develop models that had been mere sketches until then.
The core of Abū Hilāl's book is a series of akhbār all built on a similar pattern: a caliph is in conflict with someone (usually a commoner) and agrees to submit his case to an arbiter or a judge. Eventually, the arbiter or the judge decides against the caliph and the latter accepts his condemnation. The author provides a series of examples, from the time of the so-called Rāshidū n caliphs until the reign of al-Muhtadī (r. 255-256/869-870). Although there is no direct link between this little book and the legal theory developed by al-Jaṡṡāṡ, they both draw upon the same idea: that of autonomous judgeship.
In Abū Hilāl's "theory" of governmentas it appears through his narrativesthe just ruler must submit to law and to the judgment of its representatives, especially the qāḋ īs. Abū Hilāl was not a jurist, though, and he does not provide any legal justification for this pattern. As an adīb, he finds justification in the exemplary behaviour of ancient rulers, especially those of the Persian tradition. The first models of such just rulers are the Sassanian kings who, as pseudo-Jāḣ iż developed in his Kitāb al-Tāj, submitted willingly to the justice of the mōbedān mōbed once a 55 Al-Jaṡṡāṡ, in al-Khaṡṡāf, Kitāb Adab al-qāḋ ī, 30-1. 56 year. 58 According to Abū Hilāl, the Prophet agreed to submit a litigation between him and his wife ʿĀ ʾisha to an arbiter. 59 So did the first caliphs, as when a conflict arose between ʿUmar b. al-Khaṫṫāb and Ubayy b. Kaʿb. ʿUmar is depicted as the model of a just ruler, who not only agrees to appear before an arbiter, but who also wants to be treated as a common human being, regardless of his office or high rank. When the arbiter (Zayd b. Thābit) suggests that the caliph sit next to himwhich would symbolically put him on a higher level than his adversary -ʿUmar refuses and asks to sit next to his adversary on an equal footing with him. 60 Until the appearance of al-Muhtadī as the last incarnation of justice, the Umayyad 61 and ʿAbbāsid caliphs 62 exemplify the willingness of rulers to submit to the strict rules of judicial procedure and accept decisions made against them or their close relatives. 63 Even though he cannot conceal al-Mahdī's wrath at ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḣ asan al-ʿAnbarī's famous resistance to his will, Abū Hilāl portrays the caliph as being ready, at first, to submit to the qāḋ ī's adjudication. Whereas Wakīʿ reports that the caliph ordered the qāḋ ī to levy the kharāj on a large part of Baṡra's territory, Abū Hilāl states that the caliph asked ʿUbayd Allāh to adjudicate in his dispute with the inhabitants of Baṡra on that matter. 64 Abū Hilāl goes so far as to claim that al-Manṡū r threatened to dismiss the qāḋ ī of Madīna if the latter showed him any sign of respect during the hearing of a dispute between him and some camel drivers. 65 This is an odd reversal of situation if we compare this version to Wakīʿ's or al-Kindī's biographies, in which qāḋ īs are more often dismissed for having disobeyed a caliphal order.
In the late-fourth/tenth century, owing to the new political and religious situation in the empire, certain scholars were able to freely express a view of the caliphate that others had refrained from articulating for over two centuries. According to their vision, the caliph was no more than a normal human being who had to submit to the law. The true representative of God and of His law should be the qāḋ ī. The caliph is still regarded as a model for his subjects in Abū Hilāl's book. However, this pattern is turned upside down: if the caliph wants to become a model, he must behave as a normal human being. And if he wishes to not only become a just ruler, but also to reach the level of being an authentic upholder of the law, he must imitate a higher model, that of the qāḋ ī.
Conclusion
Justice is a major expression of the ruler's sovereignty. However, the development of Islam as a "religion of law" required the submission of all human beingseven their political leadersto the sharīʿa. Tensions between the judiciary and political rulers over judicial authority were inevitable, and were responsible for some of the major evolutions in Islamic institutions during the first four centuries AH/seventh to tenth century AD.
Umayyad caliphs considered themselves as representatives of God on earth and many Muslims accepted them as the best embodiment or interpreters of the sharīʿa. In difficult cases, both qāḋ īs and governors turned towards them and sought their rulings. 66 In practice, however, the Umayyad Empire was quite decentralised. Provincial governors exercised more control over judicial practices than caliphs, and thus were able to impose their views on their qāḋ īs.
Although the centralisation of qāḋ īs' appointments under al-Manṡū r and his successors prevented such judicial authority being exercised by governors, qāḋ īs still had to confront judicial interference from caliphs. Contemporaneous developments in Islamic law within new madhhabs, however, divorced the legal system from political institutions. Private scholars, some of them recruited as qāḋ īs, claimed that they alone possessed the ability to define right from wrong, and rejected the caliph's role as a legal source. Their scholarly writings provided qāḋ īs with a major tool for legitimising their decisions and for asserting their autonomy vis-à-vis the caliphate. Qāḋ īs increasingly became their own masters in the legal field. In practice, qāḋ īs were still part of social and political networks and could therefore rarely obtain actual independence. Nevertheless, jurists and other scholars developed a highly sophisticated theoretical discourse proving that qāḋ īs were magistrates whose authority could not be abolished by rulers. This theory reflected a political model that was the exact opposite of the so-called "oriental despotism" and was no less than what is now called the "rule of law". Such developments do not mean that political rulers relinquished their judicial authority. However, they had to find a new theoretical framework, which is still to be explored.
